Invasion Models

Guerrilla America – by SAMUEL CULPER III

For the benefit of quasi-academic exercise, let’s assume that the absolute worst happens in Connecticut (CT): a federal invasion.  (Although the likelihood is low right now, it could be a plausible scenario in another state for the government of tomorrow.)  If I was tasked to analyze and wargame that scenario, my initial key assumptions would be:  

a) nothing, surrounding states included, would be able to prevent it;

b) the invasion’s only acceptable outcome is total victory;

c) the invasion would be justified by a credible threat or action of violence; and

d) it would take the form of counterinsurgency (COIN) up front.

Expanding on Key Assumption D, we have two likely invasion models: Iraq and Afghanistan.

Under the Iraq model, we all remember “Shock & Awe,” which was intended to deter the will to fight a vastly superior force.  Shock and Awe is as much kinetic operations as it is psychological operations.  The ability to dominate your adversary on the ground and through the air with impunity was a large reason why Baghdad fell within the first month.  But that was preceded by years of economic warfare called sanctions.  As part of the regime’s shock and awe campaign, I would expect them to freeze the assets of Patriots before any ground war commenced.  I expect that Patriots would be identified as tax criminals, if nothing else, so the regime could score quick victories up front through arrests and show trials that would follow.  I actually like the odds of the regime invading a blue state because the regime would likely enjoy larger amounts of popular support (CT supports tough gun control at 2-1 odds, for instance).  I would expect that Patriot leaders would be forced into exile, or physically removed from office and replaced with pro-regime representatives.  Roughly one third of the CT General Assembly is Republican, and removing their leadership from CT would be a top priority for me.  Simultaneously, I would expect a heavy reliance on NSA data to identify and target the most vocal and ardent Patriots, who would be arrested as criminals.  We can call this kinetic ‘shaping operations’ – removing the leadership and facilitation of resistance in order to shape the battlespace for a quick and decisive victory.  Lastly, I would expect non-kinetic shaping operations, heavy on psychological warfare, to shape the populace into accepting the ends of the invasion (a safer socialist state), if not the means themselves.

From there, expect the introduction of stability/support operations; in essence nation-building the state government, while continuing to target Patriots in CT, and interdicting the movement of Patriots throughout the region.

The invasion of Afghanistan, on the other hand, looks much different.  There was no Shock & Awe campaign like what would happen later in Iraq.  Whereas the Coalition footprint in Iraq was large and intimidating, the Coalition footprint in Afghanistan was much smaller and more local, favoring coordination with anti-Taliban militias such as the Northern Alliance.  Applied to the CT scenario, the regime would aid and partner with state and local law enforcement who would do the heavy lifting, as opposed to regime military forces.  Whereas the Iraq invasion depended largely on overwhelming military dominance carried out by US/Coalition Forces, the beginnings of the Afghan war utilized a more indigenous-centric method of fighting the adversary, more typical of unconventional warfare (UW) than conventional.  As the US/Coalition footprint expanded, so did the Taliban’s operations against Coalition Forces, and more conventional COIN practices were implemented.

What I’ve just described is a wholly inadequate history of each invasion, but I hope that the differences between the two are clear.  These two scenarios applied to CT would be our Potential Threat Courses of Action (COA).  The Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) is a military invasion that ends resistance within the first month; however, I can’t say that the MDCOA is not also the Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA) at this point.

An understanding of the differences between these two COA models should better prepare populations to deal with that scenario.  If you have a comment, please leave it below!

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http://guerrillamerica.com/2014/03/invasion-models/