After Increasing Nat’l Debt a TRILLION in 6 Months, US Gov’t Just Gave Themselves a Massive Raise

4 thoughts on “After Increasing Nat’l Debt a TRILLION in 6 Months, US Gov’t Just Gave Themselves a Massive Raise”

1. Remember Ross Perot campaigned back in 1992 and 1996 wanting to reduce the outrageous $ 4 Trillion dollar National Debt?

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2. N.B. Fourteenth Amendment (07/09/1868) § 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.):

   Cf. Brown v. Welch, 116 Ind. 117 (1866) aff’d. Contracts Payable in Gold. Senate Resolution No. 62 (April 24, 1933) (The ultimate ownership of all property is in the State; individual so-called “ownership” is only by virtue of Government; i.e., law, amounting to mere user; and use must be in accordance with law and subordinate to the necessities of the State. The fact that citizens, at a given time may prefer specie to currency, or vice versa, cannot prevent Congress from enacting those laws which it deems necessary to the maintenance of a proper monetary system.); http://www.commonlawvenue.com/Misc/payable%20in%20gold.pdf … http://adventuresinlegalland.com/senate_resolution.pdf

   Nam: Droit ne poet pas morier. Right cannot die. Jenk. Cent. Cas. 100.
   Equity never counteracts the laws {Æquitas nunguam contravenit legis};

   Equity follows the law {Æquitas sequitur legem};

   Ex necessitate legis. From or by necessity of law. From legal necessity.

   Ex necessitate rei. From the necessity of the thing. Many acts may be done ex necessitate rei, which would not be justifiable without it; and sometimes property is protected, ex necessitate rei, which, under other circumstances, would not be so. For example, property put upon the land of another from necessity, cannot be distrained for rent. Cf. Distress; Necessity;

   Illud quod alias licitum non est necessitas facit licitum, et necessitas inducit privilegium quod jure privatur. That which is not otherwise permitted, necessity allows, and necessity makes a privilege which supersedes the law. 10 Coke, 61.

   In casu extremæ necessitatis omnia sunt communia. In case of extreme necessity, everything is in common.

   Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum necessitate juris dicendi. Jurisdiction is a power introduced for the public good, on account of the necessity of dispensing justice. [Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition].

   Necessarium est quod non potest aliter se habere. That is necessary which cannot be otherwise.

   The reason of contrary things is contrary {Contrariorum contraia est ratio};

   Laws are made to prevent the stronger from having the power to do everything {Inde datæ leges ne fortior omnia posset; Dav. 36};

   Nothing against reason is lawful {Nihil quod est contra rationem est licitum; Nihil quod est inconveniens est licitum; Coke, Litt. 97};

   That is necessary which cannot be otherwise {Necessarium est quod non potest aliter se habere};

   Necessity gives a privilege with reference to private rights. (1) self-preservation; (2) obedience; (3) act of God {Necessitas inducit privilegium quoad jura privata; Bacon, Max. Reg. 5};

   Nothing is more just that what is necessary {Nihil magis justum est quam quod necessarium est; Dav. 12};

   That which is inconvenient or against reason is not permissible in law {Quod est inconveniens aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege};

   The thing speaks for itself {Res ipsa loquitur};

   To be “necessary”, as is required by Section 3 of Article 12 of the ICCPR, requires more than that a restriction on human rights be related to, or actually further, one of the enumerated purposes. “Necessity” requires a showing that no less restrictive alternative could adequately serve the particular enumerated purpose. This interpretation of “necessity” is supported by the U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27 on Freedom of Movement in Article 12, which provides in Paragraph 14: Article 12, paragraph 3, clearly indicates that it is not sufficient that the restrictions serve the permissible purposes; they must also be necessary to protect them. Restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the desired result; and they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected. http://www.PapersPlease.org

   The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. 129, 140-141 (1869) (The doctrine on the subject of maritime hypothecation, so far as it seems useful to consider it in this case, may be summed up, we think, in these propositions: [76 U.S. 129, 141] 1. Liens for repairs and supplies, whether implied or express, can be enforced in admiralty only upon proof made by the creditor that the repairs or supplies were necessary, or believed, upon due inquiry and credible representation, to be necessary.) http://laws.findlaw.com/us/76/129.html

   Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870) (It is a familiar rule of construction of the Constitution of the Union, that the sovereign powers vested in the State governments by their respective constitutions, remained unaltered and unimpaired, except so far as they were granted to the government of the United States. That the intention of the framers of the Constitution in this respect might not be misunderstood, this rule of interpretation is expressly declared in the tenth article of the amendments, namely: ‘The powers not delegated to the United States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’ The government of the United States, therefore, can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution, and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication.); http://www.justia.us/us/78/113/case.html

   Necessary and proper clause.

   Gonzales v. Raich, 544 U.S. 1 (06/06/2005) (In McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, set forth a test for determining when an Act of Congress is permissible under the Necessary and Proper Clause: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” Id., at 421. To act under the Necessary and Proper Clause, then, Congress must select a means that is “appropriate” and “plainly adapted” to executing an enumerated power; the means cannot be otherwise “prohibited” by the Constitution; and the means cannot be inconsistent with “the letter and spirit of the [C]onstitution.” Ibid.; D. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years 1789-1888, pp. 163-164 (1985). The CSA, as applied to respondents’ conduct, is not a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/03-1454.html

   Necessary diligence. That degree of diligence which a person placed in a particular situation must exercise in order to entitle him to the protection of the law in respect to rights or claims growing out of that situation, or to avoid being left without redress on account of his own culpable carelessness or negligence.

   Necessitas inducit privilegium quoad jura privata. Necessity gives a privilege with reference to private rights. (1) self-preservation; (2) obedience; (3) act of God. Bacon, Max. Reg. 5.

   That is necessary which cannot be otherwise {Necessarium est quod non potest aliter se habere};

   Necessity gives a privilege with reference to private rights. (1) self-preservation; (2) obedience; (3) act of God {Necessitas inducit privilegium quoad jura privata; Bacon, Max. Reg. 5};

   Necessity. In general, whatever makes the contrary of a thing impossible, whatever may be the cause of such impossibilities, Whatever is done through necessity, is done without any intention, and as the act is done without will, (q. v.) and is compulsory, the agent is not legally responsible. Bac. Max. Reg. 5. Hence the maxim, necessity has no law; indeed necessity is itself a law which cannot be avoided nor infringed. Clef des Lois Rom. h. t.; Dig. 10, 3, 10, 1; Com. Dig. Pleader, 3 M 20, 3 M 30. It follows, then, that the acts of a man in violation of law, or to the injury of another, may be justified by necessity, because the actor has no will to do or not to do the thing, he is a mere tool; but, it is conceived, this necessity must be absolute and irresistible, in fact, or so presumed in point of law. The cases which are justified by necessity, may be classed as follows: I. For the preservation of life; as if two persons are on the same plank, and one must perish, the survivor is justified in having thrown off the other, who was thereby drowned. Bac. Max., Reg. 5. 2. Obedience by a person subject to the power of another; for example, if a wife should commit a larceny with her husband, in this case the law presumes she acted by coercion of her husband, and, being compelled, by necessity, she is justifiable. 1 Russ. Cr. 16, 20; Bac. Max. Reg. 5. 3. Those cases which arise from the act of God, or inevitable accident, or from the act of man, as public enemies. Vide: Act of God; Inevitable Accident; and also 15 Vin. Ab. 534; Dane’s Ab. h. t.; 2 Stark. Ev. 713; Marsh. Ins. b. 1, c. 6, s. 3; Jacob’s Intr. to. Com. Law. Reg. 74. 4. There is another species of necessity. The actor in these cases is not compelled to do the act whether he will or not, but he has no choice left but to do the act which may be injurious to another, or to lose the total use of his property. For example, when a man’s lands are surrounded by those of others, so that he cannot enjoy them without trespassing on his neighbors. The way which is thus obtained, is called a way of necessity. Gale and Whatley on Easements, 71; 11 Co. 52; Hob. 234; 1 Saund. 323, note. See 3 Rawle, R. 495; 3 M’Cord, R. 131; Id. 170; 14 Mass. R. 56; 2 B. & C. 96; 2 Bing. R. 76; 8 T. R. 50; Cro. Jac. 170; 2 Roll. Ab. 60; 3 Kent, Com. 423; 3 Rawle’s R. 492; 1 Taunt. R. 279; 8 Taunt. R. 24; St. R. 50; Ham. N. P. 198; Cro. Jac. 170; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1637; and Way.

   U.S. v. Perdomo-Espana, No. 07-50232 (9th Cir. 04/14/2008) (The test for entitlement to a defense of necessity is objective, as opposed to subjective. The defendant must establish that a reasonable jury could conclude that: 1) he was faced with a choice of evils and reasonably chose the lesser evil; 2) he reasonably acted to prevent imminent harm; 3) he reasonably anticipated a causal relation between his conduct and the harm to be avoided; and 4) he reasonably believed there were no other legal alternatives to violating the law.); http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0750232p.pdf

   Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 316 (1795) (And did a fourth state necessity exist, that the value of this land-equivalent must be adjusted by the board of property, without the consent of the party, or the interference of a Jury? Alas! how necessity begets necessity. They rise upon each other and become endless. The proprietor stands afar off, a solitary and unprotected member of the community, and is stript of his property, without his consent, without a hearing, without notice, the value of that property judged upon without his participation, or the intervention of a Jury, and the equivalent therefor in lands ascertained in the same way. If this be the Legislation of a Republican Government, in which the preservation of property is made sacred by the Constitution, I ask, wherein it differs from the mandate of an Asiatic Prince? Omnipotence in Legislation is despotism. According to this doctrine, we have nothing that we can call our own, or are sure of for a moment; we are all tenants at will, and hold our landed property at the mere pleasure of the Legislature. Wretched situation, precarious tenure! And yet we boast of property and its security, of Laws, of Courts, of Constitutions, and call ourselves free! In short, gentlemen, the confirming act is void; it never had Constitutional existence; it is a dead letter, and of no more virtue or avail, than if it never had been made.); http://www.justia.us/us/2/304/case.html

   United States v. 1,960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (Cranch) 398, 3 L.Ed. 602 (1814) (It seems to be a rule founded in common sense, as well as strict justice, that fictions of law shall not be permitted to work any wrong, but shall be used ut res magis valeat quam pereat, 3 Rep. 28, b. and this rule, so equitable in itself, seems recognized in the common law. 13 Rep. 21. 2 Vent. 200. And in respect to the doctrine of relation, this rule has been admitted in its fullest extent in civil cases. Bro. Relation, 18. 1 H. 7, 17. Bro. Debt, 139. 6 Rep. 76, b. 3 Rep. 28, b. For it has been repeatedly adjudged that relations shall never work an injury, ‘and shall never be strained to the prejudice of a third person who is not a privy or a party to the act:’ and further, that ‘in destruction of a lawful estate vested, the law will never make any fiction.’ 3 Rep. 29. 2 Vent. 200.); http://www.justia.us/us/12/398/case.html

   Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 143 (1819) (Every contract must be subjected to, limited, and interpreted by, the law of nature, which everywhere forms a part, and the best part, of the municipal code; and it is the primary canon of that code, that necessity (physical, moral necessity), knows no law, but itself.); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/17/122.html

   Restatement Second, Contracts § 161(a) (nondisclosure as equivalent to assertion when person “knows that disclosure of the fact is necessary to prevent some previous assertion from being a misrepresentation or from being fraudulent or material”);

   In general it is not plain that a man’s misfortunes or necessities will justify his shifting the damages to his neighbor’s shoulders. Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry. Co., 172 Mass. 488, 489; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922); Nor can existing contracts between private individuals preclude exercise of the police power. One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the state by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject-matter. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908); citing Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480, 50 S. L. ed. 274, 278, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127 (1905); aff’d. Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 294 U.S. 240, 308 (1935); Shoaf, Jr. v. Shoaf, No. 2010-99-2 (Henrico Co. Va. 07/24/2001);

   Barnum v. Williams, 264 Or 71, 504 P2d 122 (1972) aff’d. Maquiel v. Adkins, 175 Or.App. 43, 27 P.3d 1050 (2001) (“We consider the present state of the law to be that if a party is in violation of a motor vehicle statute, such a party is negligent as a matter of law unless such party introduces evidence from which the trier of fact could find that the party was acting as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. We so hold regardless of whether the circumstances do or do not include facts which the law regards as an emergency.” 264 Or at 78-79.); http://159.121.112.45/A105437.htm

   Ignacio v. Judges of the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 03-17181 (9th Cir. 07/12/2006) (In a typical situation we would be disqualified from hearing this appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i) (providing that a federal judge “shall” disqualify him or herself when “a party to the proceeding”). There is, however, an exception to disqualification—the “rule of necessity.”1 Pursuant to the rule of necessity, a judge is not disqualified to try a case because of a personal interest in the matter at issue if “the case cannot be heard otherwise.” United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213 (1980) (holding that the rule of necessity is an exception to the recusal requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 455). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0317181p.pdf

   ORCP 62(A) (Necessity): Whenever any party appearing in a civil action tried by the court so demands prior to the commencement of the trial, the court shall make special findings of fact, and shall state separately its conclusions of law thereon. In the absence of such a demand for special findings, the court may make either general or special findings. If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact or conclusions of law appear therein.

   ORCP 62(B) (Proposed findings; objections): Within 10 days after the court has made its decision, any special findings requested by any party, or proposed by the court, shall be served upon all parties who have appeared in the case and shall be filed with the clerk; and any party may, within 10 days after such service, object to such proposed findings or any part thereof, and request other, different, or additional special findings, whether or not such party has previously requested special findings. Any such objections or requests for other, different, or additional special findings shall be heard and determined by the court within 30 days after the date of the filing thereof; and, if not so heard and determined, any such objections and requests for such other, different, or additional special findings shall conclusively be deemed denied.

   ORS 12.230 (Acknowledgment or promise taking contract case out of statute; effect of payment) (No acknowledgment or promise shall be sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take the case out of the operation of this chapter, unless the same is contained in some writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby; but this section shall not alter the effect of any payment of principal or interest.);

   32 CFR 501.4 (Martial law) (Martial law depends for its justification upon public necessity. Necessity gives rise to its creation; necessity justifies its exercise; and necessity limits its duration.); http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2002/julqtr/32cfr501.4.htm

   That which is not otherwise permitted, necessity allows, and necessity makes a privilege which supersedes the law {Illud quod alias licitum non est necessitas facit licitum, et necessitas inducit privilegium quod jure privatur; 10 Coke, 61};

   Necessity creates equity.

   Necessity for employment of attorney. ORS 9.320 [Amended by 1975 c.451 s.171] (Necessity for employment of attorney; effect of employment) (Any action, suit, or proceeding may be prosecuted or defended by a party in person, or by attorney, except that the state or a corporation appears by attorney in all cases, unless otherwise specifically provided by law. Where a party appears by attorney, the written proceedings must be in the name of the attorney, who is the sole representative of the client of the attorney as between the client and the adverse party, except as provided in ORS 9.310.); Cf. UTCR 2.010(7) (Any pleading not bearing the name and bar number of an attorney as its author or preparer must bear a certificate in substantially this form. Complete and attach this certificate to any document to which this rule applies prior to filing. “I have truthfully completed this instrument with regard to the foregoing document I am filing with the court. I have checked all boxes and completed all blanks that apply. I selected this document for myself, and completed it without paid assistance, to the best of my abilities, pursuant to Oregon Uniform Trial Court Rule 2.010(7); ‘Pursuant to Oregon Uniform Trial Court Rule 2.010(7) I have truthfully completed this instrument with regard to the foregoing document I am filing with the alleged court. I have checked all boxes and completed all blanks that apply. I selected this document for myself, and completed it without paid assistance, to the best of my abilities, and that class of authority, reason, custom and usage ad infinitum:’
   Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-203 (1993) (It has been the law [506 U.S. 202] for the better part of two centuries, for example, that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel. Osborn v. President of Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 829 (1824); see Turner v. American Bar Assn., 407 F. Supp. 451, 476 (ND Tex. 1975) (citing the “long line of cases” from 1824 to the present holding that a corporation may only be represented by licensed counsel), affirmance order sub nom. Taylor v. Montgomery, 539 F. 2d 715 (CA7 1976), and aff’d sub nom. Pilla v. American Bar Assn., 542 F. 2d 56 (CA8 1976). As the courts have recognized, the rationale for that rule applies equally to all artificial entities. Thus, save in a few aberrant cases,5 the lower courts have uniformly held that 28 U. S. C. § 1654, providing that “parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel,” does not allow corporations, partnerships, or associations to appear in federal court otherwise than through a licensed attorney. See, e. g., Eagle Associates v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F. 2d 1305 (CA2 1991) (partnership); Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F. 2d 803, 806 (CA9) (nonprofit corporation formed by prison inmates), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 868 (1989); Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, 722 F. 2d 20, 22 (CA2 1983) (corporation); Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 699 F. 2d 1366 (CA Fed. 1983) (per curiam) (corporation); Southwest Express Co. v. ICC, 670 F. 2d 53, 55 [506 U.S. 203] (CA5 1982) (per curiam) (corporation); In re Victor Publishers, Inc., 545 F. 2d 285, 286 (CA1 1976) (per curiam) (corporation); Strong Delivery Ministry Assn. v. Board of Appeals of Cook County, 543 F. 2d 32, 34 (CA7 1976) (per curiam) (corporation); United States v. 9.19 Acres of Land, 416 F. 2d 1244, 1245 (CA6 1969) (per curiam) (corporation); Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 367 F. 2d 373, 374 (CA3 1966) (per curiam) (corporation). http://supreme.justia.com/us/506/194/case.html
   Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Author., 722 F.2d 20 (2d Cir.1983) (corporation may appear only through lawyer);
   Turner v. American Bar Association, 407 F.Supp. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (Constitution does not grant litigants right to be represented by non-lawyers, or non-lawyers right to represent others in court [AMRPC at 436]);

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3. Looks like we are returning to Status Qou from past presidents of the last 30 years. Even thought I voted for the Donald and have seen many good things happen over the last year this is NOT acceptable. He should have let the Gov’t supposedly shutdown. Shutdown? Military will still be there. Critical services will not stop. ALL the personal bodyguards of the politicians will not stop guarding them. The BS is back. Prepping has moved back to a higher priority now. The 3 B”s are taking on a new Higher meaning now with all the Gun BS laws being rammed thru. The threat is NOT from outside the US it is from within! Enemies Domestic is now the phrase.

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4. Relax guys, trump is playing 10D chess…. I wanna laugh, but it’s saddening.

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