Loretta Lynch Refuses to Say Whether It’s Illegal to Lie Under Oath

Mediaite – by Alex Griswold

During her testimony before the House Judiciary Committee Tuesday, Attorney General Loretta Lynch at one point declined to say whether it was legal or illegal to lie under oath.

Republican Congressman Jason Chaffetz quizzed Lynch on the legality of a series of acts that former Secretary of State and Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton has been accused of doing. But each time, Lynch stonewalled and refused to weigh in on whether the given act was legal or illegal.  

“Is it legal or illegal to store, house or retain classified information in a non-secure location?” asked Chaffetz.

“I would refer you to the statute,” she responded. “One could in fact have liability, again depending upon the nature, facts and circumstances.”

“Do you have any examples of where it’s legally acceptable to retain classified information in and non-secure location?” the Utah congressman followed up.

“I don’t have a hypothetical answer for that,” she responded.

Finally, Chaffetz asked whether it was legal or illegal to provide false testimony under oath, but Lynch avoided giving a direct answer. “There are a number of statutes that cover that, both at the federal and state levels. There are a number of ways in which that can be found,” she said.

Chaffetz made a noise indicating disbelief. “There’s a difference between prosecuting something and whether it’s legal or illegal,” he pointed out. “You know, these questions are pretty simple. We got millions of people with security clearance. How are they supposed to go through the gyrations that you’ve laid out in order to make a simple determination?”

“Congressman, if we had a specific fact situation, a fact pattern, that could be reviewed,” Lynch responded. “When it comes to a hypothetical situation, it would be unfair to come up with a blanket answer…”

Watch the exchange above, via C-SPAN.

http://www.mediaite.com/tv/loretta-lynch-refuses-to-say-whether-its-illegal-to-lie-under-oath/

7 thoughts on “Loretta Lynch Refuses to Say Whether It’s Illegal to Lie Under Oath

  1. “One could in fact have liability, again depending upon the nature, facts and circumstances.”

    No, Ms. LynchMob…. it’s always a crime to lie under oath in court, or in congress, and everyone knows that, but your rhetorical dancing to protect a criminal exposes the hypocrisy to the whole country.

    Thanks for your help. Millions of Americans just woke up to the fact that you’re a criminal , too.

  2. In her Professional Capacity as Attorney General, LYNCH reasonably appears to be invoking the Royal Perogative, now known as Executive Privilege, as she reasonably appears, as a Matter of Record, to have an ‘inherent and incurrable’ Conflict of Interest:

    A person ought not to be judge in his own cause, because he cannot act both as judge and party {Aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa, quia non potest esse judex et paris}; It is wrong for a man to be a judge in his own cause {Iniquum est aliquem rei sui esse judicem}; No one can judge in his own cause {In propria causa nemo judex}; It is extremely unjust that any one should be judge in his own cause {In re propria iniquum admodum est alicui licentiam tribuere sententiæ}; A judge cannot punish a wrong done to himself {Judex non potest injuriam sibi datam punire}; No man acts against himself, therefore no man can be a judge in his own cause {Nemo agit in seipsum}; No man ought to be judge in his own cause {Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa}; No one should fill two offices {Nemo duobus utatur officiis}; No one can be at once suitor and judge {Nemo potest esse simul actor et judex}; No one is presumed to have preferred another’s posterity to his own {Nemo præsumitur alienam posteritatem suæ prætulisse}; No one can ever be a judge in his own cause {Nemo unquam judicet in se}; A sentence pronounced by one who is not a judge should not harm any one {Sententia a non judice lata nemini debet nocere}; It is a maxim of every good system of law, that a man shall not be judge in his own cause. 2 L. R. 390; 6 L. R. 134 Ayl. Parerg. 451; Dict. de Jur. h. t.; Merl. Repert. h. t.; vide Jacob’s Intr. to the Com. Civ. and Can. L. 11; 8 Co. 118 Dyer, 65. Dall. Diet. h. t.;

    Miller v. C.C. Meisel Co., Inc., 183 Or App 148, 51 P3d 650 (2002) (As the court said in Lindland v. United Business Investments, Inc., 298 Or 318, 324, 693 P2d 20 (1984), “[I]n an action for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, the principal need only bear the burden of proving that the agent acted on the agent’s own behalf in a transaction connected with the agency. This alone establishes the breach of duty: conflict of interest or self-dealing is the breach of duty.”(11) (Emphasis added.); (11. In Lindland, the court also said, “Breach of the duty of loyalty is established by proof that the agent had a conflict of interest or was self-dealing.” Id. at 327.); http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/A109804.htm

    Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Smith, USDC CV-93-01112-HJF; USCA 95-35312; SC S43258 (Or. 04/22/1999) (The doctrine of adverse domination has gained currency in recent years in the context of litigation against directors and officers of insolvent financial institutions. The doctrine serves either to delay the accrual of a claim by a corporation against its directors and officers, or, in the alternative, to toll the running of the applicable statute of limitations. The doctrine is premised on the theory that it is impossible for the corporation to bring the action while it is controlled, or “dominated,” by culpable officers and directors. Courts applying the doctrine of adverse domination have reasoned that corporations act only through their officers and directors, and those officers and directors cannot be expected to sue themselves or to initiate any action contrary to their own interests.(4) See, e.g., Hecht v. Resolution Trust, 333 Md 324, 340, 635 A2d 394, 402 (Md 1994) (explaining the rationale behind the doctrine); Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Williams, 599 F Supp 1184, 1194 (D MD 1984) (same); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bird, 516 F Supp 647, 651 (D PR 1981) (same). Similarly, culpable corporate officers and directors cannot be expected to disclose their wrongful conduct to the corporation. Hecht, 333 Md at 340, 635 A 2d at 402; Williams, 599 F Supp at 1194; Bird, 516 F Supp at 651. Oregon courts long have recognized such an “adverse interest” exception. As the court stated in Saratoga Inv. Co. v. Kern, 76 Or 243, 254, 148 P 1125 (1915), a corporation is charged with knowledge of what its agent knows, unless “the agent’s relations to the subject matter are so adverse as to practically destroy the relationship, as when the agent is acting in his own interest and adversely to that of his principal, or is secretly engaged in attempting to accomplish a fraud which would be defeated by a disclosure to his principal.” (Emphasis added.) See also Restatement, Agency, § 279 (1958) (“The principal is not affected by the knowledge of an agent as to matters involved in a transaction in which the agent deals with the principal * * * as * * * an adverse party.” See Sutherland v. Wickey, 133 Or 266, 286, 289 P 375 (1930) (noting the principle that notice to an agent whose interests are conflicting with his principal is not notice to the principal, applies to public agents);); http://159.121.112.45/S43258.htm

    In her Individual Capacity the Official Record does NOT indicate if she has formally waived or invoked her anticedent rights as may be rescripted by Article Five …

    Waiver of constitutional rights. Cf. Abandonment; Abjuration; Deferment; Desertion; Renunciation; Repudiation; Surrender; Waiver;

    United States v. Forrester, Et al., No. 0550410p (9th Cir. 07/06/2007) (Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), held that a defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself but that “the accused must knowingly and intelligently forgo those relinquished benefits. . . . [H]e should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Id. at 835 (internal quotations omitted). This court has gleaned a three-factor test from Faretta, under which “[i]n order to deem a defendant’s Faretta waiver knowing and intelligent, the district court must insure that he understands 1) the nature of the charges against him, 2) the possible penalties, and 3) the ‘dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.’ ” Erskine, 355 F.3d at 1167 (quoting United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1487 (9th Cir. 1987)). On appeal, the burden of establishing the legality of the waiver is on the government, id., and “courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver,” United States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977)). See also United States v. Mohawk, 20 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing the government’s burden as “a heavy one”). Ordinarily, only the defendant’s colloquy with the court at the Faretta hearing is relevant to the waiver analysis. Id. However, a “limited exception” exists whereby “a district court’s failure to discuss each of the elements in open court will not necessitate automatic reversal when the record as a whole reveals a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Balough, 820 F.2d at 1488.); http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0550410p.pdf … Appeals Court Clarifies: Government Spyware Not Protected in Ruling (Wired Mag: By Kevin Poulsen, 07/25/2007) http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/07/appeals-court-c.html

    Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., No. 04-35563, 04-35795, 04-35842 (9th Cir. 08/24/2006) (Of course, “[n]ot all rights are waivable.” United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 845 n.7 (1997) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). For instance, “waiver is not appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be secured,” New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 116 (2000), and “a right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy.” Id. (quoting Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945)). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0435563p.pdf

    Waterway Terminals v. P.S. Lord, 242 Or 1, 26, 406 P2d 556 (1965) aff’d. Growers Refrigeration v. Pacific Electrical, 165 Or App 274, 996 P2d 521 (2000) (A “waiver” is the “intentional relinquishment of a known right.”); http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/A104720.htm

    Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-484 (1981) (A waiver of the right to counsel, once invoked, not only must be voluntary, but also must constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privilege.); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/451/477.htmlhttp://www.justia.us/us/451/477/case.html

    Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1977) (To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, see North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, at 738 (opinion of Black, J.), and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person’s reliance on his legal rights is “patently unconstitutional.” Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra, at 32-33, n. 20. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570.); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/434/357.html

    U.S. v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 399-400, 93 S.Ct. 2202, 37 L.Ed.2d 22 (1973) (And if the doctrine of stare decisis has any meaning at all, it requires that people in their everyday affairs be [412 U.S. 391, 400] able to rely on our decisions and not be needlessly penalized for such reliance.); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/412/391.html

    Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1973) (The See and Reisman decisions, and the statutory procedures of Sec. 7402(b), reflect the obvious concern that there be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of constitutional rights.); http://openjurist.org/481/f2d/945/sherar-v-m-cullen

    Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748, n. 6 (1969) (Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/397/742.html

    Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967 (1968) (We find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/390/377.html

    Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) aff’d. Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748 Fn. 6 (1970) (It has been pointed out that ‘courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights12 and that we ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ 13 A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/304/458.html

    Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utility Comm., 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937) aff’d. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 595 (2003) (We do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/301/292.html

  3. I DON’T GIVE A SHIT ABOUT STATUTES! JUST ANSWER THE GODDAMN QUESTION, YOU COMMIE PIECE OF SHIT!!!

    That should have been Chaffetz’s response.

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