The story you are about to read is true. The names have not been changed to protect the guilty. This book may have the effect of changing your life. After reading this book, you will never look at national and world events in the same way again.
None Dare Call It Conspiracy will be a very controversial book. At first it will receive little publicity and those whose plans are exposed in it will try to kill it by the silent treatment. For reasons that become obvious as you read this book, it will not be reviewed in all the “proper” places or be available on your local bookstand.
However, there is nothing these people can do to stop a grass roots book distributing system. Eventually it will be necessary for the people and organizations named in this book to try to blunt its effect by attacking it or the author. They have a tremendous vested interest in keeping you from discovering what they are doing. And they have the big guns of the mass media at their disposal to fire the barrages at None Dare Call It Conspiracy.
One of, if not the first book of awakening I had the pleasure of reading.
thanks for putting this up. I have not read it in over 30 years and now that I am older and much more in tune with what is going on in the world, it will be a good read, a scary read, and a confirming read. If you have never read this, read it and compare it to what you know to be true today. You will be astonished that it is as relative today as it was when it was written and when I read it at the age of 19 in 1981. The more things change, the more they stay the same. EYE OPENING.
Conspiracy. Criminal law, torts. An agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or an act which may become by the combination injurious to others. Formerly this offense was much more circumscribed in its meaning than it is now. Lord Coke describes it as “a consultation or agreement between two or more to appeal or indict an innocent person falsely and maliciously, whom accordingly they cause to be indicted or appealed and afterwards the party is acquitted by the verdict of twelve men.” The crime of conspiracy, according to its modern interpretation, may be of two kinds, Namely, conspiracies against the public, or such as endanger the public health, violate public morals, insult public justice, destroy the public peace, or affect public trade or business. See 3 Burr. 1321. To remedy these evils the guilty persons may be indicted in the name of the commonwealth. Conspiracies against individuals are such as have a tendency to injure them in their persons, reputation, or property. The remedy in these cases is either by indictment or by a civil action. In order to reader the offense complete, there is no occasion that any act should be done in pursuance of the unlawful agreement entered into between the parties, or that any one should have been defrauded or injured by it. The conspiracy is the gist of the crime. 2 Mass. R. 337; Id. 53; 86 Mass. R. 74; 3 S. & R. 220 4 Wend. R. 259; Halst. R. 293 2 Stew. Rep. 360; 5 Harr. & John. 317 8 S. & R. 420. But see 10 Verm. 353. By the laws of the United State’s, St. 1825, c. 76, § 23, 3 Story’s L. U. S., 2006, a willful and corrupt conspiracy to cast away, burn or otherwise destroy any ship or vessel with intent to injure any underwriter thereon, or the goods on board thereof, or any lender of money on such vessel, on bottomry or respondentia, is, by the laws of the United States, made felony, and the offender punishable by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and by imprisonment and confinement at hard labor, not exceeding ten years. By the Revised Statutes of New York, vol. 2, p. 691, 692, it is enacted, that if any two or more persons shall conspire, either, 1. To commit any offense; or, 2. Falsely and maliciously to indict another for any offense; or, 3. Falsely to move or maintain any suit; or, 4. To cheat and defraud any person of any property, by any means which are in themselves criminal; or, 5. To cheat and defraud any person of any property, by means which, if executed, would amount to a cheat, or to obtaining property by false pretenses; or, 6. To commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to trade and commerce, or for the perversion or obstruction of justice, or the due administration of the laws; they shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. No other conspiracies are there punishable criminally. And no agreement, except to commit a felony upon the person of another, or to commit arson or burglary, shall be deemed a conspiracy, unless some act besides such agreement be done to effect the object thereof, by one or more of the parties to such agreement. When a felony has been committed in pursuance of a conspiracy, the latter, which is only a misdemeanor, is merged in the former; but when a misdemeanor only has been committed in pursuance of such conspiracy, the two crimes being of equal degree, there can be no legal technical merger. 4 Wend. R. 265. Vide 1 Hawk. 444 to 454; 3 Chit. Cr. Law, 1138 to 1193 3 Inst. 143 Com. Dig. Justices of the Peace, B 107; Burn’s Justice, Conspiracy; Williams’ Justice, Conspiracy; 4 Chit. Blacks. 92; Dick. Justice Conspiracy, Bac. Ab. Actions on the Case, G 2 Russ. on Cr. 553 to 574 2 Mass. 329 Id. 53; 65 Mass. 106 2 D R. 205; Whart. Dig. Conspiracy; 3 Serg. & Rawle, 220; 7 Serg. & Rawle, 469 4 Halst. R. 293; 5 Harr. & Johns. 317; 4 Wend. 229; 2 Stew. R. 360; 1 Saund. 230, u. 4. 16 Am.Jur.2d 283 § 215; 2 Stat. 65 § 23; Act of March 3, 1825, Ch. 65, § 23; 16 Am.Jur.2d 283 § 215; For French law, see Merl. Rep. mot Conspiration Code Penal, art. 89. Cf. Accessory; Aider and abettor; Alter ego; Common design; In concert; Instrumentality rule; Overt act; Predicated act; Racketeering; Respondeat superior; Same hands faction; Sole actor doctrine; Unity of possession;
U.S. Attorneys Manual, Department of Justice, CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL (1994) http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/readingroom/criminal/taxc23.htm (Updated June, 2001 to) http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/readingroom/2001ctm/23ctax.htm
Withdrawal from conspiracy.
U.S. Attorneys Manual, Department of Justice (1994) 23.08[3] (Withdrawal Defense) (In United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), the Supreme Court defined withdrawal from a conspiracy to mean: Affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators have generally been regarded as sufficient to establish withdrawal or abandonment. 438 U.S. at 464-65. The courts have held that mere cessation of activity is insufficient to prove withdrawal. Rather, some sort of affirmative action to defeat the object of the conspiracy is required. See Juodakis, 834 F.2d at 1102; Lash, 937 F.2d at 1083; Krasn, 614 F.2d at 1236; Gonzalez, 797 F.2d at 917; Finestone, 816 F.2d at 589.); http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/readingroom/criminal/taxc23.htm (Updated to) http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/readingroom/2001ctm/23ctax.htm
U.S. Department of Justice, CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL (1994) § 23.08[3] (Withdrawal Defense): The government is not required to prove that each member of a conspiracy committed an overt act within the statute of limitations. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369-70 (1912). See also United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1234 (7th Cir. 1981) (interpreting the Hyde decision). Once the government shows a member joined the conspiracy, their continued participation in the conspiracy is presumed until the object of the conspiracy has been achieved. See, e.g., United States v. Juodakis, 834 F.2d 1099, 1103 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Barsanti, 943 F.2d 428, 437 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1992); United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Finestone, 816 F.2d 583, 589 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 948 (1987). However, a showing of withdrawal before the limitations period (i.e., more than six years prior to the indictment where the limitations period is six years) is a complete defense to conspiracy. United States v. Read, 658 F.2d at 1233. The defendant carries the burden of establishing this affirmative defense. United States v. Juodakis, 834 F.2d at 1102-03; United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 385 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965); United States v. Lash, 937 F.2d 1077, 1083 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 397 (1991); United States v. Boyd, 610 F.2d 521, 528 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1089 (1980); Krasn, 614 F.2d at 1236; United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1384 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1076 (1979); United States v. Finestone, 816 F.2d at 589. But see Read, 658 F.2d at 1236 (burden of production on defendant; burden of persuasion remains on government to negate withdrawal defense); United States v. Jannoti, 729 F.2d 213, 221 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984) (initial burden on defense, then shifted to government); United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 860 (1989) (government retains burden of persuasion); United States v. MMR Corp., 907 F.2d 489, 501 (5th Cir. 1990) (burden is two step process on defense and government); Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit (1992 Ed.), § 8.05D, p.122. (following Read). In United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), the Supreme Court defined withdrawal from a conspiracy to mean: Affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators have generally been regarded as sufficient to establish withdrawal or abandonment. 438 U.S. at 464-65. The courts have held that mere cessation of activity is insufficient to prove withdrawal. Rather, some sort of affirmative action to defeat the object of the conspiracy is required. See Juodakis, 834 F.2d at 1102; Lash, 937 F.2d at 1083; Krasn, 614 F.2d at 1236; Gonzalez, 797 F.2d at 917; Finestone, 816 F.2d at 589. In short, the government technically is not required to prove that each member of the conspiracy committed an overt act within the statute period. However, in practice, the prosecutor should critically review those conspirators whose membership predates the limitations period, and be prepared to rebut a withdrawal defense coupled with a statute of limitations defense.); http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/readingroom/criminal/taxc23.htm (Updated to) http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/readingroom/2001ctm/23ctax.htm
Smith v. U.S., No. 11-8976 (USSC 01/09/2013) (In appeal from conviction of conspiracy charges for role in illegal drug business, judgment is affirmed, where: 1) a criminal defendant bears the burden of proving withdrawal from a conspiracy regardless of when the purported withdrawal took place; 2) allocating the burden to defendant does not violate the Due Process clause; 3) Congress did not address in 21 U.S.C. section 846 or 18 U.S.C. section 1962(d) the burden of proof for withdrawal, and thus the common law rule that defendant bears the burden of proving affirmative defenses remains; and 4) the burden of proof does not change even when withdrawal is the basis for a statute-of-limitations defense.); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/11-8976.html
U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 393 (1948) (With the conspiracy thus fully established, the declarations and acts of the various members, even though made or done prior to the adherence of some to the conspiracy become admissible against all as declarations or acts of co-conspirators in aid of the conspiracy.10 We think that all of the declarations and acts which we have set forth in this opinion are in aid of the ultimate conspiracy. We do not attempt to fix a date when the conspiracy was first formed. At least, the declarations which we have quoted were made with the purpose of advancing a plan which ultimately eventuated in the licenses of 1929. (10. Van Riper v. United States, 2 Cir., 13 F.2d 961, 967; Lefco v. United States, 3 Cir., 74 F.2d 66, 68; Deacon v. United States, 1 Cir., 124 F.2d 352, 358; United States v. Compagna, 2 Cir., 146 F.2d 524, 530.)); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/333/364.html
Pinkerton v. U.S., 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946) (We take a different view. We have here a continuous conspiracy. There is here no evidence of the affirmative action on the part of Daniel which is necessary to establish his withdrawal from it. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, Ann.Cas.1914A, 614.); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/328/640.html
United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d 524, 527 (CA2 1944) cert. denied, 324 U.S. 867 (1945) (The indictment having been filed on March 18, 1943, it was necessary to show that it continued until March 18, 1940, and there was evidence in plenty that it did, although several of the accused were not shown to have continued their connection with it as late as that. To meet this lapse in the evidence as to them, the prosecution invoked the well established doctrine that anyone, once shown to have been a member of a conspiracy which lasts until the beginning of the statutory period, must satisfy the jury by affirmative proof that he disconnected himself from it before that period began. So the judge charged, and he was quite right; we have so lately affirmed such a ruling that we need only refer to the authorities on which we then relied. United States v. Cohen, 2 Cir. 145 F.2d 82, 90.);
ORS 161.465 [1971 c.743 s.62; 1973 c.836 s.340] (Duration of conspiracy) (For the purpose of application of ORS 131.125: (1) Conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct which terminates when the crime or crimes which are its object are completed or the agreement that they be committed is abandoned by the defendant and by those with whom the defendant conspired. (2) Abandonment is presumed if neither the defendant nor anyone with whom the defendant conspired does any overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy during the applicable period of limitation. (3) If an individual abandons the agreement, the conspiracy is terminated as to the individual only if and when the individual advises those with whom the individual conspired of the abandonment or the individual informs the law enforcement authorities of the existence of the conspiracy and of the participation of the individual therein.); http://landru.leg.state.or.us/ors/home.htm
N.B. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Principals); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3 (Accessory after the fact); 18 U.S.C.A. § 4 (Misprision of felony); USSG § 2X4.1 (Misprision); ORS 161.155 [1971 c.743 s.13] (Criminal liability for conduct of another); ORS 161.430 [1971 c.743 s.56] (Renunciation as a defense to attempt); ORS 161.460 [1971 c.743 s.61] (Renunciation as defense to conspiracy); ORS 161.440 [1971 c.743 s.58] (Renunciation as defense to solicitation); and that class of authority, infra:
Acting and consenting parties are liable to the same punishment {Agentes et consentientes pari poena plectentur};
Error of law is injurious {Error juris nocet; 4 Bouvier, Inst. n. 3828; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 139, n.};
An error not resisted is approved {Error qui non resistitur, approbatur; Doct. & Stud. c. 70};
It is the same thing to do a thing as not to prohibit it when in your power {Idem est facere, et nolle prohibere cum possis; 3 Co. Inst. 178};
He who finds a libel and does not destroy it is punished {Inveniens libellum famosum et non corrumpens punitur};
He who does not blame, approves {Qui non improbat, approbat};
He who does not prevent a thing which he can prevent, is considered as doing it {Qui non obstat quod obstare potest, facere videtur};
He who does not forbid what he is able to prevent, is considered to assent {Qui non prohibet id quod prohibere potest assentire videtur};
He who spares the guilty punishes the innocent {Qui parcit nocentibus innocentes punit};
He who can and ought to forbid a thing [if he do not forbid it] directs it {Qui potest et debet vetare, jubet};
He who is silent appears to consent {Qui tacet, consentire videtur; 6 Toull. liv. 3, t. 3, n. 32, note; 14 Serg. & Rawle, 393; 2 Supp. to Ves. jr. 442; 1 Dane’s Ab. c. 1, art. 4, § 3; 8 T. R. 483; 6 Penn. St. R. 336; 1 Greenl. Ev. 201; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1313; Jenk. Cent. 32; 6 Barb. N.Y. 28, 35;};
What I approve I do not object. I cannot approve and object at the same time {Quod approbo non reprobo};
Ratification is equal to a command {Ratihabitio mandato æquiparatur; Dig. 46, 3, 12, 4};
The thing speaks for itself {Res ipsa loquitur};