Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (Tratado de Guadalupe Hidalgo in Spanish), officially entitled the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement between the United States of America and the Mexican Republic,[1] is the peace treaty signed on February 2, 1848, in the Villa de Guadalupe Hidalgo (now a neighborhood of Mexico City) between the United States and Mexicothat ended the Mexican–American War (1846–48).
With the defeat of its army and the fall of its capital, Mexico entered into negotiations to end the war. The treaty called for the US to pay $15 million to Mexico and to pay off the claims of American citizens against Mexico up to $3.25 million. It gave the United States the Rio Grande as a boundary for Texas, and gave the US ownership of California and a large area comprising roughly half of New Mexico, most of Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and parts of Wyoming and Colorado. Mexicans in those annexed areas had the choice of relocating to within Mexico’s new boundaries or receiving American citizenship with full civil rights. Over 90% chose to become US citizens.
The US Senate ratified the treaty by a vote of 38–14. The opponents of this treaty were led by the Whigs, who had opposed the war and rejected Manifest Destiny in general, and rejected this expansion in particular.[2]
Read the rest here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Guadalupe_Hidalgo
Gadsden Purchase
The Gadsden Purchase (known in Mexico as Spanish: Venta de La Mesilla, “Sale of La Mesilla”[1]) is a 29,640-square-mile (76,800 km2) region of present-day southern Arizona and southwestern New Mexico that was purchased by the United States in a treaty signed on December 30, 1853 by James Gadsden who was the American ambassador to Mexico at that time. It was then ratified, with changes, by the U.S. Senate on April 25, 1854, and signed by 14th President Franklin Pierce, with final approval action taken by Mexico‘s government and their General Congress or Congress of the Union on June 8, 1854. The purchase was the last territorial acquisition in the contiguous United States to add a large area to the country.
The purchase included lands south of the Gila River and west of the Rio Grande; it was largely so that the U.S.A. could construct a transcontinental railroad along a deep southern route. (This happened with the transcontinental railroad, constructed by the Southern Pacific Railroad in 1881/1883). It also aimed to reconcile outstanding border issues between the U.S. and Mexico following the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the earlier first Mexican–American War of 1846–1848.
As the railroad age evolved, business-oriented Southerners saw that a railroad linking the South with the Pacific Coast would expand trade opportunities. They thought the topography of the southern portion of the original boundary line to the Mexican Cession (future states of California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, western Colorado) of 1848 after the Mexican-American War was too mountainous to allow a direct route. Projected southern railroad routes tended to run to the North at their eastern ends, which would favor connections with northern railroads and ultimately favor northern seaports. Southerners saw that to avoid the mountains, a route with a southeastern terminus might need to swing south into what was still then Mexican territory.
The administration of 14th President Franklin Pierce, strongly influenced by Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, (later President of the southern seceding Confederate States) saw an opportunity to acquire land for the railroad, as well as to acquire significant other territory from northern Mexico.[2] In the end, territory for the railroad was purchased for $10 million ($260 million today), but Mexico balked at any large-scale sale of territory.[3] In the United States, the debate over the treaty became involved in the sectional dispute over slavery, ending progress before the American Civil War in the planning or construction of a transcontinental railroad.
Read the rest here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gadsden_Purchase
Well even if it was stolen they got it back now.
They should just call southern California northern Mexico.
Hell they even already have all the cities named in Spanish.
How did that happen?
Boy was that sneaky.
Kind of makes you wonder who was here first huh.
You might also look up and digest a book called: The Acquisition of Oregon which is no longer available OnLine, but it describes ‘in detail’ why the Spanish were stopped ar the Cal – Oregon Border as they had ‘no missions’ up here and therefore could not claim Conquest before the Northwest Terroitories Act and Jefferson’s purchase: http://www.1st-hand-history.org/AcqOfOr/v1/album1.html
Sorry but my PDF of it is to large to email …
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 297-298, 21 Sup Ct. 770, 45 L. Ed. 1088 (1901) (The doctrine that those absolute withdrawals of power which [182 U. S. 298] the Constitution has made in favor of human liberty are applicable to every condition or status has been clearly pointed out by this Court in Chicago, Rock Island &c. Railway v. McGlinn, (1885) 114 U.S. 542, where, speaking through Mr. Justice Field, the Court said ( P. 546): “It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States, that, whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation of sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the country — that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights — continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession, public property passes from one government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power — and the latter is involved in the former — to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect, and the laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new government upon the same matters. But with respect to other laws affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, and designed to secure good order and peace in the community and promote its health and prosperity which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is general that a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct action of the new government, they are altered or repealed. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 26 U.S. 542; Halleck, Int.Law, chap. 34, § 14.”); http://supreme.justia.com/us/182/244/case.html
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 367, 21 Sup Ct. 770, 45 L. Ed. 1088 (1901) (“This is now a well settled rule of the law of nations, and is universally admitted. Its provisions are clear and simple and easily understood, but it is not so easy to distinguish between what are political and what are municipal laws, and to determine when and how far the constitution and laws of the conqueror change or replace those of the conquered. And in case the government of the new state is a constitutional government of limited and divided powers, questions necessarily arise respecting the authority, which, in the absence of legislative action, can be exercised in the conquered territory after the cessation of war and the conclusion of a treaty of peace. The determination of these questions depends upon the institutions and laws of the new sovereign, which, though conformable to the general rule of the law of nations, affect the construction and application of that rule to particular cases.”); http://supreme.justia.com/us/182/244/case.html
Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 212-213, 11 S. Ct. 80, 83, 34 L.Ed. 691 (1890) (By the law of nations, recognized by all civiliezed states, dominion of new territory may be acquired by discovery and occupation as well as by cession or conquest; and when citizens or subjects of one nation, in its name, and by its authority, or with its assent, take and hold actual, continuous, and useful possession (although only for the purpose of carrying on a particular business, such as catching and curing fish, or working mines,) of territory unoccupied by any other government or its citizens, the nation to which they belong may exercise such jurisdiction and for such period as it sees fit over territory so acquired. This principle affords ample warrant for the legislation of congress concerning guano islands. Vatt. Law Nat. lib. bk. 1, c. 18; Wheat. Int. Law, (8th Ed.) 161, 165, 176, note 104; Halleck, Int. Law, c. 6, 7, 15; 1 Phillim. Int. Law. (3d Ed.) 227, 229, 230, 232, 242; 1 Calvo Droit Int. (4th Ed.) 266, 277, 300; Whiton v. Insurance Co., 109 Mass. 24, 31. Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory, is not a judicial, but a political, question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens, and subjects of that government. This principle has always been upheld by this court, and has been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances. Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, 324; U. S. v. Palmer, Id. 610; The Divina Pastora, 4 Wheat. 52; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 307, 309; Keene v. McDonough, 8 Pet. 308; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511, 520; Williams v. Insurance Co., 13 Pet. 415; U. S. v. Yorba, 1 Wall. 412, 423; U. S. v. Lynde, 11 Wall. 632, 638. It is equally well settled in England. The Pelican, Edw. Adm. App. D; Taylor v. Bar- [137 U.S. 202, 213] clay, 2 Sim. 213; Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 De Gex, F. &. J. 217, 221, 233; Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co., 36 Ch. Div. 489, 497; Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus, 38 Ch. Div. 348, 356, 359.); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/137/202.html
Chicago, R.I. & P. R.Y. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546-547 (1885) (It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the country-that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights-continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession public property passes from one government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power-and the latter is involved in the former-to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new government upon the same matters. But with respect to other laws affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, and designed to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is general, that a change of govern- [114 U.S. 542, 547] ment leaves them in force until, by direct action of the new government, they are altered or repealed. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 542; Halleck, Int. Law, c. 34, 14.); http://laws.findlaw.com/us/114/542.html
Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 607 (1850) (The jurisdiction of the conqueror is complete. He may change the form of government and the laws at his pleasure, and may exercise every attribute of sovereignty. The conquered territory becomes a part of the domain of the conqueror, subject to the right of the nation to which it belonged to recapture it if they can. By reason of this right to recapture, the title of the conqueror is not perfect until confirmed by treaty of peace. But this imperfection in his title is, practically speaking, important only in case of alienation made by the conqueror before treaty. If he sells, he sells subject to the right of recapture. But although, for purposes of sale, the title of the conqueror is imperfect before cession, for purposes of government and jurisdiction his title is perfect before cession. As long as he retains possession he is sovereign; and not the less sovereign because his sovereignty may not endure for ever.); http://www.justia.us/us/50/603/case.html
The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120, 6 L.Ed. 268 (1825) (But from the earliest times war has existed, and war confers rights in which all have acquiesced. Among the most enlightened nations of antiquity, one of these was, that the victor might enslave the vanquished.); http://supreme.justia.com/us/23/66/case.html
De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398, 443, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3.776 (1815) (Of this great system of maritime law it may be truly said, “Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una lex, et sempiterna et immortalis, continebit.” Cic. Frag. de Repub. lib. 3 (Editio Bost. 1817, tom. 17, p. 186). [There will not be one law at Rome, another at Athens, one law now, another hereafter; but one eternal and immortal law shall bind together all nations throughout all time {Non erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athænis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una lex, et sempiterna, et immortalis continebit;];
Sed vide:
Custom is another law {Consuetudo est altera lex; 4 Coke, 21};
The custom of the place is to be observed {Consuetudo loci observanda est; 6 Coke, 67};
Custom can neither arise from nor be taken away by injury {Consuetudo neque injuria oriri neque tolli potest};
A prescriptive and legitimate custom overcomes the law {Consuetudo præscripta et legitima vincit legem; Coke, Litt. 113};