The Corporation – Full Movie

Uploaded on Oct 20, 2011 by TulsaLiberty’s channel
Among the 40 interview subjects are CEOs and top-level executives from a range of industries: oil, pharmaceutical, computer, tire, manufacturing, public relations, branding, advertising and undercover marketing; in addition, a Nobel-prize winning economist, the first management guru, a corporate spy, and a range of academics, critics, historians and thinkers are also interviewed.

2 thoughts on “The Corporation – Full Movie

  1. People started to be treated as corporations, it is not that corporations started to be treated as people. This is the big lie of this otherwise interesting piece of programming.

  2. In Defense of Humanity w/ AL Whitney – October 22, 2016 Hour 1
    Corporations, FrankinFood:
    Part I:
    Part II:
    N.B. The king is the origin of all franchises {Roy est l’original de touts franchises};
    Statute of Gloucester 6 Ed. I (1278) (Curbed expansion of large private holdings and established the principle that all private franchises were delegated by, and subordinate to, the crown.);

    The Corporation as a Private Government in the World Community, 46 Va.L.Rev. 1539, 1542-1549 (1960);



    Articles of Incorporation. A document that must be filed with a state in order to incorporate. Among the things it typically must include are the name and address of the corporation, its general purpose and the number and type of shares of stock to be issued. Cf. Commerece clause; Diffusions of responsibility;
    Three makes a corporation; three members are required to constitute a corporation {Tres faciunt collegium; 1 Bl.Comm. 469};
    Act of February 21, 1871 (An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia) (Acts of the Forty-first Congress, Section 34, Session III, chapters 61 and 62)
    Act of December 30, 1963: Public Law 88-243, 77 Stat. § 28:1-101, HR 5338 (Uniform Commercial Code for the District of Columbia);
    ORS 71.1010 (Uniform Commercial Code);
    26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(3) (An organization treated as a corporation for Federal tax purposes even though it may not qualify as such under applicable state law. What is designated as a trust or a partnership, for example, may be classified as an association if it clearly possesses corporate attributes. Corporate attributes include: centralized management, continuity of existence, free transferability of interests, and limited liability.);
    28 § 3002(15) “United States” means—(A) a Federal corporation; (B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or (C) an instrumentality of the United States.);
    U.C.C. § 9-403 (Foreign Corporation must file Financing Statement or Security Agreement with the Secretary of State);
    ORS 30.570 (Action to annul corporate existence on direction of Governor);
    ORS 30.580 (Action to annul corporate existence on leave of court);
    ORS 30.590 (Judgment against corporation);
    ORS 30.600 (Action to annul letters patent);
    Corporate capacity. The thing taxed is not the mere dealing in merchandise, in which the actual transactions may be the same, whether conducted by individuals or corporations, but the tax is laid upon the privileges which exist in conducting business with the advantages which inhere in the corporate capacity of those taxed, which are not enjoyed by private firms or individuals. {Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.; Hale v. Henkel; Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Cheek; Redfield v. Fisher}.
    Redfield v. Fisher, 135 Ore. 180, 292 P. 813, 819 (1930) (The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere privilege of existing. The corporation is an artificial entity which owes its existence and charter powers to the state; but the individuals’ rights to live and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise cannot be imposed. 26 R.C.L. Taxation § 209, p. 236; Cooley, Taxation (4th Ed.) § 1676; In re Opinion of the Justices, 195 Mass. 607, 84 N.E. 499.);
    Corporate shell.
    U.S. v. Garro, No. 06-50513 (9th Cir. 02/28/2008) (Garro also argues that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence for using “sophisticated means.” The district court found that Garro had “used and incorporated numerous shell corporations, many of which he incorporated during this scheme,” that he had intentionally “left behind numerous confusing and misleading documents” regarding the investors’ funds, that he had forged signatures on real estate transactions, and had made “other associates sign for him for other real estate purchases, to avoid having his name appear on the transaction or assets.” Garro’s objection notwithstanding, his conduct was precisely what the Sentencing Guidelines describe as indicating “sophisticated means”: “conduct such as hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the use of . . . corporate shells.” USSG § 2F1.1, cmt. n.15 (1998).););
    Corporate veil. Cf. Corporation sole;
    Vuylsteke v. Broan, 172 Or App 74, 83, 17 P3d 1072 (2001) (We turn first to defendants’ third assignment of error–that the trial court erred by piercing the corporate veil and holding defendant Broan personally liable. The trial court ruled that “there was complete disregard of the corporate form” and that “there is less cash and less liquid asset in the corporation than this judgment.” Defendants rely on Amfac Foods v. Int’l Systems, 294 Or 94, 654 P2d 1092 (1982). In Amfac Foods, the court said: “When a plaintiff seeks to collect a corporate debt from a shareholder by virtue of the shareholder’s control over the debtor corporation rather than on some other theory, the plaintiff must allege and prove not only that the debtor corporation was under the actual control of the shareholder but also that the plaintiff’s inability to collect from the corporation resulted from some form of improper conduct on the part of the shareholder. This causation requirement has two implications. The shareholder’s alleged control over the corporation must not be only potential but must actually have been exercised in a manner either causing the plaintiff to enter the transaction with the corporation or causing the corporation’s default on the transaction or a resulting obligation. Likewise, the shareholder’s conduct must have been improper either in relation to the plaintiff’s entering the transaction or in preventing or interfering with the corporation’s performance or ability to perform its obligations toward the plaintiff.” Id. at 108-09.);
    Ivy v. Plyler, 246 CalApp.2d 678, 54 Cal.Rptr. 894, 897 (1966) (Under doctrine of “alter ego”, court merely disregards corporate entity and holds individual responsible for acts knowingly and intentionally done in the name of corporation.);
    Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 90, 3 L.Ed. 38 (1809) (In that case the objection, that a corporation was an invisible, intangible thing, a mere incorporeal legal entity, in which the characters of the individuals who composed it were completely merged, was urged and was considered. The judges unanimously declared that they could look beyond the corporate name, and notice the character of the individual. In the opinions, which were delivered seriatim, several cases are put which serve to illustrate the principle, and fortify the decision.);
    Instrumentality rule. Under this rule, corporate existence will be disregarded where corporation (subsidiary) is so organized and controlled and it’s affairs so conducted as to make it only an adjunct and instrumentality of another corporation (parent corporation), and parent corporation will be responsible for the obligations of its subsidiary.
    Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., C.C.A. Okl., 96 F.2d 693, 704. The so-called “instrumentality” or “alter ego” rule states that when a corporation is so dominated by another corporation that the subservient corporation becomes a mere instrument and is really indistinct from controlling corporation, then the corporate veil of dominated corporation will be disregarded, if to retain it results in injustice. National Bond Finance Co. v. General Motors Corp., D.C.Mo., 238 F.Supp. 248, 255. Cf. Alter ego; Bonding of privateers; Collective entity rule; Common design; Contributory negligence; Corporate veil; Diffusions of responsibility; Instrumentality rule; Respondeat superior; Same hands faction; Sole actor doctrine; Unity of possession;
    Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (This Court in Austin held that political speech of corporations can be regulated because “[s]tate law grants [them] special advantages,” ante, at 1397, and because this “unique state-conferred corporate structure … facilitates the amassing of large treasuries,” ante, at 1397-1398. In so holding, the Court relied principally on United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 641 (1950), which held that corporations do not have Fourth Amendment rights that would allow them to thwart an FTC subpoena for corporate documents. “[C]orporations can claim no equivalent with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy . . . . They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities,” held the Court. “The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation.” Id. at 652. On the Granting of Bill of Rights Protections to Corporations as Pertains to the Case of Nike Inc. v. Kasky:);
    Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839) (Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of article IV privileges and immunities clause; therefore, a state does not have to give extraterritorial effect to corporation charters granted by another state.); See also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868) (“[t]he term citizens . . . applies only to natural persons . . . not to artificial persons created by the legislature”).
    “[T]he corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its power.” Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906); aff’d. McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90, 91, 26 S.Ct. 385, 50 L.Ed. 671 (1906) (Indeed, the authorities are numerous to the effect that an officer of a corporation cannot set up the privilege of a corporation as against his testimony or the production of their books.); N.B. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86, 3 L.Ed. 38 (1809) (That invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen; and, consequently, cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the United States, unless the rights of the members, in this respect, can be exercised in their corporate name.);
    Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-203 (1993) (It has been the law [506 U.S. 202] for the better part of two centuries, for example, that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel. Osborn v. President of Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 829 (1824); see Turner v. American Bar Assn., 407 F. Supp. 451, 476 (ND Tex. 1975) (citing the “long line of cases” from 1824 to the present holding that a corporation may only be represented by licensed counsel), affirmance order sub nom. Taylor v. Montgomery, 539 F. 2d 715 (CA7 1976), and aff’d sub nom. Pilla v. American Bar Assn., 542 F. 2d 56 (CA8 1976). As the courts have recognized, the rationale for that rule applies equally to all artificial entities. Thus, save in a few aberrant cases,5 the lower courts have uniformly held that 28 U. S. C. § 1654, providing that “parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel,” does not allow corporations, partnerships, or associations to appear in federal court otherwise than through a licensed attorney. See, e. g., Eagle Associates v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F. 2d 1305 (CA2 1991) (partnership); Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F. 2d 803, 806 (CA9) (nonprofit corporation formed by prison inmates), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 868 (1989); Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, 722 F. 2d 20, 22 (CA2 1983) (corporation); Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 699 F. 2d 1366 (CA Fed. 1983) (per curiam) (corporation); Southwest Express Co. v. ICC, 670 F. 2d 53, 55 [506 U.S. 203] (CA5 1982) (per curiam) (corporation); In re Victor Publishers, Inc., 545 F. 2d 285, 286 (CA1 1976) (per curiam) (corporation); Strong Delivery Ministry Assn. v. Board of Appeals of Cook County, 543 F. 2d 32, 34 (CA7 1976) (per curiam) (corporation); United States v. 9.19 Acres of Land, 416 F. 2d 1244, 1245 (CA6 1969) (per curiam) (corporation); Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 367 F. 2d 373, 374 (CA3 1966) (per curiam) (corporation).
    Sed vide:
    Koffler/Reppy, Common Law Pleading, p. 414-15 n. 26 (West, 1969) (A Plea to the Jurisdiction of the person must be Pleaded in person and not by Attorney. If Pleaded by an Attorney, it amounts to a Submission to the Jurisdiction of the Court. Illinois: Mineral Point R. Co. v. Keep, 22 Ill. 9, 74 Am.Dec. 124 (1859); Nispel v. Western Union R. Co., 64 Ill. 311 (1872); Pratt v. Harris, 295 Ill. 504, 129 N.E. 277 (1920); Virginia: Culpeper Nat. Bank v. Tidewater Imp. Co., Inc., 119 Va. 73, 89 S.E. 118 (1916), held that a Plea to the Jurisdiction of the person by a corporation must be by an Attorney; West Virginia: Davidson v. Watts, 111 Va. 394, 69 S.E. 328 (1910).

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