Analysis: Russia “Evacuates” Syria Naval Base

Russia's nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky navy sailors attend a greeting ceremony for the Russian official delegation at Syria's Mediterranean port of Tartus. (RIA Novosti)Syria Report – by David Byrne

Reports indicate that Russia has recently pulled it’s personnel from Syria due to the security situation and for diplomatic reasons.

In an interview with the Al-Hayat newspaper, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov said:  

Presently, the Russian Defense Ministry has not a single person stationed in Syria. The base does not have any strategic military importance.

Additionally, Russia Today, in an article published recently, reports:

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister says all personnel had been evacuated from the navy resupply base in Tartus, Syria, adding that not a single Russian military serviceman remained in the country.

Social media is abuzz with the implications of such a move. The two primary opinions among commentators are that Russia has scrambled to abandon Syria and/or that [as a result], the green light has been given for possible intervention by other state actors, specifically America and it’s allies.

The use of the word “evacuate” in Russia Today’s article compounds the panicked response by readers, who assume Russia’s decision, whenever it was made, was in a scramble to abandon Syria in a surrender to international pressure. Additionally, the Western media promoted view of a Syrian government with it’s back against the wall, it’s days numbered and as a “sinking ship”, further solidifies the inappropriate perceptions and responses.

There are several factors that contribute to Russia’s policy on Syria. To be understood, the following points must be, at least considered:

  • Russia’s policy on Syria is informed by deceiving Western maneuvering which eventually led to a NATO campaign on Libya. Essentially, Russia felt betrayed. Russia is seemingly, primarily interested in the sovereignty of states, which it perceives the United States and it’s allies of undermining.
  • Russia, most likely echoing memories of Chechnya, is mindful that extremist tendencies in the Middle East pose an increasingly bigger threat. This idea is underlined as more and more foreign militants travel to Syria from Chechnya and beyond. Worth noting also, is the influx of extremists from the Al-Qaeda affiliated “Islamic State of Iraq” which was established as a result of the 2003 Iraq invasion.
  • Syria  is not a major arms market or strategic military ally, despite common opinions which state otherwise – stated without context and importantly, empirical evidence. Indeed, Qatar’s offers to purchase military equipment from Russian dealers are of greater monetary value than those offered by Syria.
  • Additionally, Syria’s existing and pre-conflict contracts have been mostly unfulfilled. Many differing opinions exist on the veracity of reports which suggest the advanced S-300 air defense system having being delivered to Syria. Furthermore, rumors abound regarding Russian military experts in Syria, training personnel there on the use of the system. Add to this, an existing 2012 contract for combat training aircraft – still yet to be fulfilled. Importantly, some arms have been delivered to Syria, specifically anti-ship missiles. However, the likelihood of their deployment against the insurgency is low – perhaps non-existent.
  • The military-industrial complex is an important factor, but not hugely important.

Note: Russia’s reported/speculated consultation with Syrian officials about potential arms deals comes with Russian insistence that it is, by international law, entitled to negotiate weapons deals with sovereign states. Furthermore, it highlights America’s insistence, and that of it’s allies, of arming non-state actors which includes extremist insurgent (and oftentimes international) groups operation in Syria.

Tartus Naval Facility

tartus

Russia’s naval facility is located on Syria’s western port city of Tartus, on the Mediterranean coast.

The installation is referenced in Russian as a “Material-Technical Support Point” (Пункт материально-технического обеспечения, ПМТО) and therefore, not a “base”. Indeed, the Soviet-era facility, opened under a 1971 agreement, can only maintain four medium-sized vessels under specific technical circumstances. Only auxiliary naval vessels are capable of being supported by Tartus, and not any of the Russian navy’s major warships. Footage from 2012 by RTR Russian TV, shows the facility in Tartus – minimally staffed and with just a few operational buildings such as offices and vehicle storage sheds.

Significantly, Russia has deployed a sixteen-ship flotilla in the Mediterranean – none of them are scheduled to make a port stop at Syria’s Tartus.

It is common for proponents of Western policy on Syria to criticize Russia’s position on Syria. The criticism usually surrounds Russia’s “self-interest” in the region, backing a “despotic regime” and the aforementioned arms deals.

Critics of Russia’s position commonly establish their argument on a perception that Russia’s last naval facility outside of  former Soviet Union, the Tartus naval facility, is a large-scale Russian military installation in the Mediterranean. Added to this misconception, is a portrayal of Russian worries about losing a key strategic foothold in the Middle East.

Conclusion: A Client-Based Relationship

In essence, Russia, unlike it’s Cold War predecessor, bases it’s position not on hawkish geopolitical aspirations which mirror Western efforts of abundant regime-change, but for reasons outlined above. It’s position is based on rational perceptions which consistently echo the need of respect for the respect and sovereignty of states.

In the main, portrayal of Russian positions on Syria are at best, misunderstood, and at worst, bordering on the absurd and echoing the paranoia of the McCarthy era. Not limited to Russian positions on Syria, claims abound centering on Syria as an Iranian proxy, even as a Hezbollah proxy. To understand Syria, is to understand the government and foreign policy of the Hafez al-Assad era. It’s the absence of this understanding which contributes to a widely-held myth that the Syrian government is a sinking ship, it’s army with it’s back to the wall and on the run. Indeed, virtually all mainstream media outlets predicted the fall of the government as far back as mid-2012. Just this month, the Syrian army scored a victory over insurgents in Al-Qusayr.

The foreign policy of “Syria al-Assad” was a reflection on Syria’s influence as a regional superpower, not as a proxy of Russia or Iran. This reality continues today and is widely argued to be a primary influencing factor for the predominance of efforts to effect regime change in the country.

Against the odds, which includes an insurgency backed by a number of regional and international actors, the Syrian army has militants on the run and scrambling for more arms and ammunition. While sectarian atrocities increase, the West continues to back what it lovingly refers to as rebels. To add to this, Russia is portrayed as backing a “cruel dictator” even as it desperately pushes for dialogue which doesn’t come with much-stated pre-condition of the impossible: “Assad must go”.

Russia is not in an alliance with Syria and therefore, is not abandoning it. Russian policy on Syria is merely being tailored to deal with misconceptions and finger-pointing by Western commentators and mainstream media outlets.

Critics of Russia’s policy are reminded that the Syrian government has, in line with Russia’s statements, insisted on it’s availability for peaceful dialogue in an effort to bring about a political solution. This clarity has been met with further, unrelenting efforts to arm an opposition which continues, even as recently as last week, to refuse negotiations to bring about an end to the conflict.

Essentially, the media war continues as intensely as ever. As a result, the “first casualty of war is the truth”. For sure, Russia will continue to oppose further intervention by international and regional actors. Importantly, behind the scenes military (and intelligence) co-operation between Russia and Syria is probable, but due to the nature of it’s secrecy, isn’t available for analysis or commentary. Despite this, as the recent deployment of a massive naval flotilla shows, Russia will continue to flex it’s muscle in the region in response to American efforts to dominate the region.

http://syriareport.net/russia-evacuates-syria-naval-base/

2 thoughts on “Analysis: Russia “Evacuates” Syria Naval Base

  1. Hmm this is an odd one and no mistake.

    We have reports and more reports of Russia doing the exact opposite, this week alone Russia bringing in more Marines and special forces and then this comes along and says the naval base is empty and abandoned?

    The idea too of Putin suddenly abandoning Tartus when it was under his insistence that Tartus carried on as a Russian base is equally confusing, are we to believe that Vlad has just suddenly decided to send Assad a “Dear John” and thrown him to the wolves just when Assad is making clear headway to bringing the rebellion to an end?

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