By Kit Klarenberg and William Evans – The Grayzone
Documents obtained by The Grayzone reveal how British soldiers and spies censor news reporting on ‘national security,’ coercing reporters into silence. The files show the Committee boasting of a “90% + success rate” in enforcing the official British line on any controversial story – or disappearing reports entirely.
A new trove of documents obtained by The Grayzone through freedom of information (FOI) requests provide unprecedented insight into Britain’s little-known military and intelligence censorship board. The contents lay bare how the secretive Defence and Security Media Advisory (DSMA) Committee censors the output of British journalists, while categorizing independent media as “extremist” for publishing “embarrassing” stories. The body imposes what are known as D-Notices, gag-orders systematically suppressing information available to the public.
The files provide the clearest view to date of the inner workings of the opaque committee, exposing which news items the British national security state has sought to shape or keep from public view. These include the bizarre 2010 death of a GCHQ codebreaker, MI6 and British special forces activity in the Middle East and Africa, the sexual abuse of children by government officials, and the death of Princess Diana.
The files show the shadowy Committee maintains an iron grip over the output of legacy British media outlets, transforming British journalists to royal court stenographers. With the Committee having firmly imposed themselves on the editorial process, a wide range of reporters have submitted “apologies” to the board for their media offenses, flaunting their subservience in order to maintain their standing within British mainstream media.
In addition, the documents also show the Committee’s intentions to extend the D-Notice system to social media, stating its desire to engage with “tech giants” in a push to suppress revealing disclosures on platforms like Meta and Twitter/X.
How The Grayzone obtained the files
The DSMA Committee describes itself as “an independent advisory body composed of senior civil servants and editors” which brings together representatives of the security services, army, government officials, press association chiefs, senior editors, and reporters. The system forges a potent clientelist rapport between journalists and powerful state agencies, heavily influencing what national security matters get reported on in the mainstream, and how. The Committee also routinely issues so-called “D-Notices,” demanding media outlets seek its “advice” before reporting certain stories, or simply asking they avoid particular topics outright.
The DSMA Committee is funded by and housed in Britain’s Ministry of Defence (MOD), chaired by the MOD’s Director General of Security Policy Paul Wyatt, and 36-year British Army veteran Brigadier Geoffery Dodds serves as its Secretary, raising serious questions about the extent to which British ‘news’ on national security could effectively be written by the Ministry of Defence.
Even though the MOD explicitly retains the right to dismiss its Secretary, the DSMA Committee insists it operates independently from the British government. This means the Committee isn’t subject to British FOI laws.
So how did The Grayzone obtain these files?
The unprecedented disclosure was the result of an effort by the Committee to assist Australia’s government in creating a D-Notice system of their own. In doing so, it established a papertrail which Canberra was forced to release under its own FOI laws. Australian authorities fought tooth and nail to prevent the documents’ release for over five months, until the country’s Information Commissioner forced the Department of Home Affairs to release them.
Official ‘advice’
The files obtained by The Grayzone comprise records of multiple meetings attended by officials from a variety of Australian government departments and the DSMA Committee, answers from the UK’s Committee staff to questions posed by Canberra on how the system functions in practice, and a 36-page report from a 2015 internal DSMA Committee review which outlines the history of the D-Notice system, and includes a comprehensive list of requests for “advice” received and submitted over the previous five years.
The Committee operates simultaneously secretly and above ground. The documents note “conversations between the DSMA system and journalists/media organisations are confidential.” In fact, the Committee states in a briefing given to Australian officials that it isn’t even “required to submit evidence from discussions with media as part of police investigations or court proceedings.”
In theory, the system is voluntary, and publications are not legally obliged to comply with the Committee’s orders to censor or distort information. But the vast majority of British journalists obey the DSMA Committee’s “advice,” with nearly all D-notices and advice resulting in stories being spiked or altered.
The Committee’s 2015 internal review, which was prompted by the Edward Snowden affair, explained how “in serious cases,” the British government can “seek a court injunction” or prosecute journalists who violate Committee advice under the Official Secrets Act – a point the DSMA Secretary, Brig. Dodds, emphasized in meetings with Australian officials. Since then, Britain has introduced sweeping new national security laws under which journalists and whistleblowers could also face prosecution.
DSMA conceals MI6 murder of crack codebreaker?
Contained within the internal 2015 DSMA review is a list of examples of “requests for advice” sent to and from the Committee between May 2011 and May 2014. The logs are highly illuminating, revealing the topics about which British reporters felt the need to consult the Committee, and stories the body sought to distort or bury altogether. It is unclear from the document whether particular “requests” entailed the Committee writing to journalists and editors before broadcast and/or publication, or vice versa.
A huge number of requests – 50 in total – were filed in relation to the involvement of British intelligence in the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program and related “cooperation” with Muammar Gaddafi’s External Security Organization, as well as the inquest into the death of Gareth Williams, a crack GCHQ codebreaker seconded to MI6.
In August 2010, Williams died under extremely strange circumstances in a central London residence owned by Britain’s foreign intelligence agency. Williams’ death was officially ruled “unnatural and likely to have been criminally mediated.” He’d been dead for 10 days by the time his body was discovered in a locked bag in his bathroom.
Inexplicably, neither GCHQ nor MI6 had alerted authorities to the codebreaker’s prolonged absence from work. It was only when his sister informed GCHQ he was missing the agencies alerted police – following an unexplained five-hour delay. Investigating detectives were subsequently prohibited from interviewing Williams’ spy agency colleagues, or reviewing relevant documents.
The British press quickly moved on from the case, despite the coroner stating that MI6 involvement in Williams’ death was a “legitimate line of inquiry,” which had not been satisfactorily explored by authorities. In the years since, unsubstantiated conspiracy theories claiming Russia was somehow responsible for his murder have widely proliferated, while the deeply suspect conduct of Williams’ British intelligence employers has been forgotten by UK media – a trend which could potentially be attributed to DSMA interventions.
The files also show how from May to November of 2011, 29 requests related to “intel agencies” were lodged. This included “Libyan involvement,” no doubt a reference to MI6 and SAS operatives being captured infiltrating the country as Tripoli descended into the chaos of a Western-sponsored proxy war. There were 16 requests pertaining to “Wikileaks,” as well as “D For Discretion,” a BBC radio program examining the DSMA Committee’s operations. Whether this reflects the British state broadcaster asking the Committee for information, or journalists wanting guidance for reporting on its contents, is unclear.
Between November 2011 and May 2012, the DSMA issued advice on 14 occasions related to special forces involvement in the London Olympics, and a “failed hostage rescue [operation] in Nigeria.” This references a botched March 2012 Special Boat Service effort to save a pair of European kidnapping victims held by Boko Haram, which collapsed when they were executed by their captors. Details of the raid reported in the media varied from outlet to outlet, suggesting conflicting information may have been provided by the Committee.
There were also a number of “miscellaneous” inquiries related to “Porton Down ‘victims.’” It’s unclear why the phrase “victims” was presented in inverted commas, as it’s well-established numerous highly unethical human experiments were conducted over decades at Porton Down, Britain’s leading biological and chemical warfare research institute. In at least one case, a Porton Down test subject was unlawfully killed after being exposed to nerve agents. Much like the victims of the CIA’s MKULTRA mind control program, many British soldiers were secretly dosed with LSD at the facility throughout the 1960s.
‘Intel agencies’ and Princess Diana’s death
From May to November 2012, the Committee handled requests relating to “alleged [British special forces] involvement in Syria.” It was widely speculated that British special forces were present in Syria at this time, though few details have emerged since.
Concurrently, the DSMA was also preoccupied with the mysterious shooting in September 2012 of members of the Iraqi-British al-Hilli family in the French Alps. The case remains unsolved today, but in February Paris suggested an “elite” Swiss special forces soldier “who went off the rails” may have been responsible.
The November 2012 to May 2013 period saw requests over a “possible [special forces] rescue op in Nigeria,” a “PQ” – personal question? – regarding a “paedo,” and the March 1996 Dunblane Massacre in which known pedophile Thomas Hamilton murdered 16 children and their teacher at a Scottish primary school. Police reports on Hamilton linking him to influential local figures and historic sex abuse were inexplicably sealed for 100 years, and the mass shooting prompted a national ban on handguns.
Between May and November 2013, seven requests regarding “special forces” were filed in relation to the August 1997 death of Princess Diana. Incredibly, a combined total of 85 “intel agency” requests surfaced on Diana’s passing, and NSA leaker Edward Snowden’s revelations. In a disquieting testament to the DSMA Committee’s efficacy, the British media almost entirely ignored the Guardian’s reporting on Snowden’s leaks.
What remains uncertain is what intelligence-connected information the Committee dealt with related to the death of Princess Diana.
“Miscellaneous” requests during this time period involved a parliamentarian visiting a brothel, “Scottish independence,” and the case of Hollie Greig, a woman with Down’s Syndrome who alleged she was a victim of a child sex abuse ring involving influential Scottish figures, including police, judges, and other prominent individuals. The deaths of three SAS operatives from heatstroke during a dangerous mountain training exercise in July 2013 was also subject to Committee “advice.”
Finally, the document lists requests during November 2013 – May 2014. This again included “Snowden disclosures”, alongside “MPS [Metropolitan Police] and child pornography,” and Operation Ore. Operation Ore saw thousands arrested on charges of downloading pedophilic content in the early 2000s. However, many were found innocent, numerous prosecutions fell apart, dozens of potentially falsely accused Britons committed suicide, and much of the crackdown’s evidentiary basis was demonstrated to be likely fraudulent.
‘Apologies received’ from servile journalists
While the files show a shocking number of salacious stories were handpicked for censorship by the DSMA, just as alarming is the submissiveness with which mainstream ‘journalists’ greet the DSMA Committee’s edicts.
Incredibly, public minutes of Committee meetings regularly feature “apologies… received from” numerous journalists. Presumably, these wayward reporters neglected to consult the DSMA before publishing a particular story, or let certain information seep into the public domain the Committee wasn’t happy about.
At one stage, in a written response to questions from Australia’s Attorney-General, DSMA Secretary Dodds crowed how reporters “very rarely” fail to follow its “advice”, and if outlets do “publish information that may be harmful to national security,” the Committee can demand the offending article’s removal.
“The DSMA Secretary indicated that approximately 90% of the UK media view the DSMA System positively,” the report stated, adding that the few renegade journalists “who are not supportive of the system” are “mostly the strongest proponents of media freedom.”
According to figures cited in Ian Cobain’s 2016 book The History Thieves, British reporters voluntarily submit 80-90% of stories they believe could be of interest to the Committee for official examination, and potential state censorship, in advance of publication.
The documents provide an up-close view of the censorship process, showing how the DSMA Committee carries out “one-on-one” consultations with journalists that go beyond mere advice, and refers to the use of “track changes,” a feature in word processor software that allows users to suggest edits and add commentary.
In extraordinary circumstances, such as the Snowden revelations, the Committee would issue its “advice” to “all editors” of major British outlets, though it cautioned such a measure could backfire and generate “increasing media awareness” of a topic deemed off-limits.
DSMA Secretary Dodds described the consideration of “public interest” as being “of no concern when issuing advice.”
The DSMA Committee is a uniquely British institution – at once operating in plain sight but virtually hidden from public view due to media omertà, issuing non-binding “advice” reporters almost invariably obey. As the 2015 internal review notes, no other country has “any comparable system” to the UK’s D-Notice regime. However, it appears some officials in Canberra were seeking to emulate the system, asking Australian media to “give notice ahead of publication” so authorities could opine on it – an arrangement strongly resembling the advisory component of the D-Notice system.
Four years later, the Committee began to formally cooperate with officials in Canberra to help them bring the D-Notice system to Australia, showing the Committee’s eagerness to export the system overseas.
DSMA considers non-compliant journalists ‘extreme’
A briefing on the D-Notice system given to Australian officials boasts that “instances of [journalists] publishing information against DSMA advice” happens “very rarely,” and “tends to be” the work of “extreme, non-[mainstream media] organizations.” One notable example the Committee cited of an “extreme” publication refusing to toe its line was Declassified UK, an independent publication focused on national security matters that was founded by historian Mark Curtis. Though its critical reporting is almost universally ignored by mainstream British media, Declassified UK’s coverage is frequently covered by international news outlets.
The outlet repeatedly crossed the Committee by reporting on a “copy of ministerial brief inadvertently sent” from the MOD to the site’s editor in response to an FOI request, as well as publishing an article naming a British special forces officer “without seeking DSMA advice.” Declassified UK subsequently refused to remove the individual’s name despite pressure from DSMA Secretary Geoffrey Dodds.
Declassified UK being branded as “extreme” by the Committee is particularly troubling given another article published by the outlet, which exposed “embarrassing details of [British government] views on a developing country,” is also listed in the briefing, with the caveat that the article was of “no DSMA concern.” Evidently, Declassified UK is regarded as dangerous and being actively monitored by the Committee, even though it has chosen not to opt-in to the supposedly voluntary D-Notice system, and often isn’t even breaking its informal rules.
The DSMA Secretary’s complaint accusing Declassified UK of publishing information “embarrassing” to the British government directly contradicted the 2015 internal review, which explicitly stated the Committee was uninterested in “information that may cause political and official embarrassment.”
From the British government’s perspective – and the DSMA Committee’s by extension – the proliferation of inconvenient information is deeply problematic. As the briefing notes, “the DSMA system is a UK system operating in a globalised world,” and “the prevalence of digital media means that UK information can be published in other countries, and there is no recourse for the DSMA to prevent this.” However, “in the main, overseas publication of UK national security information rarely happens.”
The 2015 internal review of the D-Notice system saw the “national context and culture” of Britain – where journalists generally have little access to top decision makers and are largely happy to accept government instruction – as “key determinants” to upholding the censorship regime.
In the “UK context,” the review states, “general access by the media to government sources of information is more tightly controlled,” and there is an “expectation that contacts will usually be through government press officers.” This means contact between high ranking government officials and media is restricted to a “limited number of trusted journalists and media organisations,” and any access to noteworthy government sources is the “exception rather than the rule.”
Notably, in correspondence between the DSMA Secretary and Australian officials, the Secretary said the media’s “[interpretation] of the purpose of the [D-Notice] system” was to be able to “publish/broadcast information it wants to” without “damaging national security,” implying that the press was entrusted with protecting the secrets of Britain’s intelligence agencies and military.
This dynamic was confirmed in a 2015 op-ed by DSMA vice-chair Simon Bucks, who praised the “collaborative spirit” of the “system… run by ex-military top brass, whose job was to arbitrate between journalists and officials.” Bucks proudly proclaimed that this system had “worked for a century.”
Minutes of an April 2023 DSMA Committee meeting note the body’s deputy secretary lamented the “extreme sensitivity (in national security terms) of some of the material” that the Committee prevented from being reported by the British media over the past six months. He added that some of this material “had been of the most sensitive nature he had seen” since joining the Committee.
During this same timeframe, The Grayzone published a series of reports on London’s secret, central role in the Ukraine proxy war. These incendiary exposés received significant international attention, and were reported on by media outlets the world over – apart from Britain.
In private discussions with Canberra revealed by the FOI files, the Committee repeatedly stated “no DSMA action” is taken on “information widely available in the public domain,” and “the DSMA Secretary does not advise” on such matters. Nonetheless, minutes of an April 2023 Committee appear to contradict these claims.
The records single out a journalist who was successfully pressured into not publishing information about a British Army unit “about to deploy on operations overseas,” in an unstated country. Despite complying, the journalist argued the presence of British forces in the region “was widely known” in the country itself, formed “part of a very large international coalition effort,” and “there was open source evidence to prove it.”
As such, “the availability online of commercially available overhead imagery as well as photographs and videos with tracking data meant information previously the preserve of national intelligence effort was freely available to all in real time.” This was no deterrent to DSMA intervention, however.
DSMA seeks expansion into social media
Though social media’s “partnership” with traditional British media has been effectively cemented, the Committee still views it as a problematic area that has evaded its system of narrative control.The 2015 internal review contains several lengthy passages identifying “new digital media” as a threat to the system’s very existence, citing WikiLeaks releases of Afghanistan and Iraq war files and Snowden’s leaks as examples. These revelations were said to “demonstrate the difficulty of exercising any kind of restraint through the [D-Notice] system” in the online age.
While the British media largely overlooked these disclosures, the internet had created a “global public domain,” providing information which news outlets outside the country could cover. To limit the damage of these disclosures, the Committee’s review proposes the inclusion of “representatives of new digital media” within the DSMA collective. However, it acknowledged that suppressing social media would be a tall task.
Minutes from a 2022 meeting between Australian officials and the Secretary also outline these worries: “globalised media” and “reluctance of digital industry” prevent the D-Notice system from working effectively, and that he believed that “tech giants” did not want to engage with him because they wanted to “settle a bargain with [the UK] government.”
A written briefing noted that Britain’s DSMA was the “only [such] system in a globalized information arena,” and described the need for the “tech giants” to “Strike a grand bargain” with the British government as one of its ongoing “challenges.”
In February 2024, Politico reported that the Committee was “trying to woo Big Tech” through outreach efforts to Google, Meta, ‘X’ and other social media giants.
At the moment, governments can request social media platforms remove content if it violates local laws or platform rules. But the Committee wants to impose a much more draconian regime of information control, compelling tech firms to monitor their platforms for content that might be covered by D-Notices, and actively seek its advice on whether to censor it. DSMA Secretary Dodds told Politico that tech giants “won’t have anything to do with us,” but expressed hope state internet regulation “could create potential leverage” the Committee might exploit.
Despite what the DSMA Committee perceives as the “reluctance” of “resistant” social networks to engage with the Committee, they remained undeterred in trying to court them into the system. The DSMA Secretary told Politico the future news landscape will necessarily entail “continued increase in social media” and online publications, “so we need to get into this game.” Given the Committee has so effectively infiltrated every major newsroom in Britain, exploiting its censorship system to influence the coverage of international events, it is almost certain to escalate its push for social media suppression.