Is New York City Ready for a Dirty Bomb? – An Open Letter to All Utility Companies

Phantom Report

As Americans, we have learned to place a tremendous emphasis on our security, especially in the days subsequent to the September 11th attacks. Many of us, however, have very little knowledge of, or complete ignorance about the magnitude of destruction and annihilation that can be caused by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP). For those not in the know, it is sometimes called a transient disturbance, such as a short burst of electromagnetic energy. It may occur in the form of a radiated, electric or magnetic field or conducted electrical current depending on the source.  

EMP is generally damaging to electronic equipment, and its management is an important branch of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) engineering. At higher energy levels, an EMP event such as a lightning strike can cause more widespread damage to aircraft structures and other objects.

The damaging effects of high-energy EMP have been used to create EMP weapons, both nuclear and non-nuclear.

 

In order to acquire a better understanding of EMP and the massive carnage that it would bring about, Dave Hodges, an award winning psychology, statistics and research professor and the host of The Common Sense Show on radio has written the following comprehensive description.

“Our power grid is susceptible to hurricanes, flooding, lightening strikes and Corona Mass Ejections (CME). The grid is also vulnerable to Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP). Dr. John Casti, author of the book, X Events The Collapse of Everything states that EMP is only something that we have known about since the 1950s when the United States detonated nuclear weapons in above-ground testing in the South Pacific. When one sets off a nuclear weapon, a pulse is emitted which “short circuits” all electronics and permanently damages them.

In 2010, an executive summary from the Federal Energy and Regulatory Commission, warned that an EMP would destroy the power grid, or at minimum, would seriously damage it. The most malicious threat would be a High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP). A HEMP attack would have a devastating impact on all the normal channels of government coordination and communication, including intelligence and data gathering assets, and nuclear forensics. Indeed, with a severe societal breakdown, the basic continuity of government agencies would be at risk. Under such circumstances, it is judged unlikely that the source of a HEMP attack, given even a minimal attempt to disguise it, would ever be known.

In two years following an EMP attack with the majority of people dead, there would be no opposition to a Chinese/Russian military occupation for the remaining populace.

Adding to the likelihood that an EMP would be used to subdue this country is the fact that the United States military system is protected against EMP and American businesses and the general public are not. Therefore, critical infrastructure controlled by the globalists could survive while the rest of us fight for our survival.”

Taking this information into account, the Jewish Voice has sent e-mail inquiries to all of the utility companies in the northeastern section of the United States to ascertain whether they could provide cogent responses to the 26 questions listed below that were supplied to us by stopemp.org. We have contacted Con Ed, New Jersey Power and Light, the Long Island Power Authority, among many others. Thus far, we have not received any specific or detailed responses to what actions would be taken to avert a EMP attack and what measures they have implemented to protect the general populace from this very real and pernicious threat.

JUST HOW VULNERABLE IS THE U.S. ‘GRID’?

On November 13-14, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), over 200 electric utilities and representatives from various federal, state and local departments and agencies conducted a coast-to-coast drill called GridEx II. It reportedly simulated disruptions of the nation’s bulk power distribution system (“the grid”). Details of the scenarios simulated have not been released and NERC has announced that a report on its results will not be available for approximately three months.

According to press accounts, however, at least one, very important assumption was made in GridEx II: telecommunications and internet access would not be interrupted due to the simulated power blackouts. This assumption is so unjustified in virtually any circumstance of widespread power disruption as to distort the insights from a drill predicated upon it – and to undermine its value as a tool for assessing the grid’s actual vulnerabilities.

The realism and, therefore, the value of GridEx II may have been further degraded depending on the answers to the following questions about other assumptions made by the exercise’s designers:

1. Did GridEx scenario involve multiple states? What was the radius of the blackout? How far away were unaffected regions from the affected region center? What was the total nationwide number of customers in simulated grid outage because of GridEx II?

2. Was the blackout protracted, lasting weeks, months, or years, or did the blackout last merely hours or days?

3. What was the largest single simulated outage because of GridEx II?

4. At the end of the exercise, how many customers still had not had power restored?

5. Did the exercise simulate any disruption of the commercial telecommunications network (voice and data) commonly used to communicate among Reliability Coordinators, Generator Operators, Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Load Serving Entities?

6. Were satellite phones used during the exercise? Were the satellite phones reliable or were there dropped calls, inability to complete calls, inadequate audio quality, and the like?

7. How would the absence of telecommunications and internet (likely after UPS and backup power are exhausted) have affected the exercise?

8. Did the exercise simulate any disruption of private communications networks commonly used by electric utilities to communicate SCADA data between control centers and substations?

9. What kind of equipment experienced simulated physical damage during the exercise? How long would it take to replace this equipment? In what country is this equipment commonly made?

10. Did any control centers run out of fuel for backup generators during the simulated exercise? How long did the exercise run? How many hours of fuel are typically stored on-site at control centers?

11. Did any fuel distributors fail to perform to Service Level Agreements during the exercise? Were fuel distributors involved in the exercise at all?

12. Did any control centers experience simulated physical intrusions? Were any physical intrusions “successful” (i.e., disrupted control center operations)?

13. Did the exercise simulate roads clogged with stalled cars and/or refugees? Or were utility crews and fuel trucks able to transit roads under normal conditions?

14. After days, lack of food and water will make personal restoration extremely difficult across the board. This is especially problematic for emergency services personnel and grid restoration. Did GridEx include this problem? If so, how was the recovery process affected?

15. In some scenarios, the blackout can affect major portions of the North American continent such that bringing in help from unaffected regions is not possible or can involve major delays. Did the GridEx assume there would be help from nearby unaffected regions?

16. Did the exercise simulate physical damage to transformers and generators (which is possible with cleverly executed cyber attacks)? If so, how long did it take to replace damaged extra high voltage transformers? How long did it take to replace damaged generators?

17. Did the exercise simulate the loss of fresh water and food supplies? If so, how did this affect the recovery process?

18. Did the exercise simulate the loss of wastewater treatment and sanitation? How did this affect the recovery process?

19. Did the exercise simulate the loss of financial services including funds transfer in banks and retail outlets? If so, how did this affect the recovery process?

20. Fuel at gas distribution depots and gas stations is pumped with electric pumps, so gasoline and diesel fuel will not be able to be pumped. Did the exercise include this problem?

21. Due to EPA regulations, distribution of natural gas to homes has recently been converted in many areas from being gas-self-powered to requiring electric pumps. So gas will also not be available if the power goes of. Where gas is available, fires will occur due to the failure of electric ignition devices. Did the exercise include natural gas fires? If so, how did this affect the recovery process?

22. A combination of lack of fuel and a few percent of stalled cars, and all transportation routing and monitoring systems being down (meaning no air traffic control or radar for planes, track switching for trains, or stoplights for cars), will mean transportation will be gridlocked and will be, at best, only minimally functional for some days and then be non-functioning. Delivery of fuel and life-sustaining supplies will be severely hampered. Did GridEx include this problem? If so, how was the recovery process affected?

23. After 1-2 days when backup power runs out, hospitals will be without power. After that, most vulnerable patients will die, many medicines will expire due to lack of refrigeration, and health care will be very basic, at best. Sanitation will suffer without electricity. Did GridEx include this problem? If so, how was the recovery process affected?

24. Within a few days, a lack of food and water will make personnel retention problematic, across the board. This is especially true for emergency services personnel and grid restoration personnel. Did GridEx include this problem? If so, how was the recovery process affected?

25. Nuclear power plants in the blackout area will trip offline and be shut down. Nuclear facilities have around a week of backup diesel fuel, so the core and the spent-rod cooling ponds can be kept from melting or burning for around a week, unless externally supplied diesel trucks are organized and convoyed into the affected area. In some cases, control system failures will also make that difficult. Backup fire-hose cooling will not work, since the city water system will be down. If adequate fuel supplies cannot be trucked in from remote locations, Fukushima-like events will begin contaminating large areas with radioactive fission products. Did GridEx include this problem? If so, how was the recovery process affected.

26. Did the exercise simulate major industrial accidents as a result of a protracted blackout, like nuclear reactor meltdowns, refinery fires, gas line explosions, chemical fires causing toxic clouds etc.?

For more information on GridEx II, the dangers associated with an vulnerable bulk power distribution system and the work of the EMP Coalition aimed at mitigating such vulnerabilities, visit www.StopEMP.org.

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